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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
CLINT DONALD YOUNG, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 950350-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
(1992 as Amended) whereby a defendant in a district court 
criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from a 
final order for anything other than a first degree or capital 
felony. 
ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony of 
a prior bad act into evidence under Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence? 
"The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is a question of 
law that we review for correctness. However, the trial court's 
subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by 
the appellate court and only be overruled if they are clearly 
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erroneous." State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994) 
(citations omitted). 
This issue were preserved in a pre-trial motion (R. 33-38) 
and by an oral objection at trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 169). 
2. Was Young denied the effective assistance of counsel: 
One, because of trial counsel's failure to adamantly object at 
trial to testimony of prior bad acts being admitted under Rule 
404(b) without first considering the "prejudice" of such 
testimony under Rule 4 03; and two, the result of trial counsel's 
failure to request a limiting instruction from the trial court 
pursuant to Rule 105 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
"Where the ineffective assistance claim is first raised on 
direct appeal, this court can only determine that the defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel if it can do so as a 
matter of law...If counsel's performance is clearly deficient, 
but prejudice cannot be determined on the record before us, 
remand is appropriate." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 
App. 1993); State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 
1993); State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 175 (Utah App. 1992). 
To establish ineffective counsel Young, therefore, must 
show: "(1) that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in 
some demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of the trial 
would probably have been different but for counsel's error." 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 
L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 473, 477 (Utah App. 
2 
1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Utah App. 1989); 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Rule 105/ Utah Rules of Evidence 
When evidence is admissible as to one party or for one 
purpose but not admissible as to another party or for 
another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall 
restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the 
jury accordingly. 
Rule 403# Utah Rules of Evidence (1995) 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative 
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404, Utah Rules of Evidence (1995) 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other 
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Clint Donald Young appeals from his February 15, 1995, 
second-degree felony conviction of forgery in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated § 76-6-501. Specifically, Young appeals the trial 
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court's admission of evidence regarding a prior bad act under 
Rule 4 04 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Trial Court Disposition 
On or about July 26, 1994, Appellant, Clint Donald Young, 
was charged, by information, with one count of forgery (R. 18). 
The Utah County Public Defenders Association was appointed to 
represent Young. A preliminary hearing was conducted in the 
Fourth Circuit Court, Orem Department, on August 18, 1994, and 
Young was bound-over to Fourth District Court (R. 14, 19, 181). 
At an arraignment held on October 20, 1994, before the 
Honorable Boyd L. Park, Young plead "not guilty" to the charge 
and a jury trial was scheduled (R. 29-30) . 
Prior to trial, Young filed a Motion and Memorandum to limit 
evidence of prior bad acts under Rules 403-404 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence (R. 33-38) . The State objected (R. 44-52) ; and the 
trial court deferred its ruling until trial (R. 56). Also prior 
to trial, Young requested new counsel and David Cundick, conflict 
counsel for the Utah County Public Defenders Association, was 
appointed as counsel (R. 57). 
On February 15, 1995, a jury trial was held in the Fourth 
District Judicial Court, the Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding (R. 
153-56). At the close of trial, Young was convicted by the jury 
of one count of forgery in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-
6-505 (Id.). 
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On April 6, 1995, Young was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison for an indeterminate term of one to fifteen years and was 
ordered to pay fines and restitution (R. 161-62, 182). 
After sentencing, Young's trial counsel, David Cundick, was 
allowed to withdraw as counsel and the Utah County Public 
Defenders Association was appointed as appellate counsel (R. 163-
64, 167) . 
This appeal followed, notice having been filed with the 
Fourth District Court on May 3, 1995 (R. 172). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On May 1, 1994, a forged payroll check in the amount of 
$396.69 was used to buy $177.40 worth of groceries at the 
Albertson's market located on Center Street in Orem (R. 2/15/95 
Tr. at 83-84, 87, 88, 113). The bearer of the check received the 
remainder of the check, $219.29, in change from Albertson's 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 113). 
The check was drawn on the account of Circle A Outfitters at 
the Draper Bank and was endorsed by two signatures from Circle A 
Outfitters (2/15/95 Tr. at 83, 115-118). The check was also 
allegedly initialed by Jeff Southworth, a manager of the 
Albertson's store in Orem (2/15/95 Tr. at 83-85, 86). One of the 
endorsing signatures was that of John Norris, who with Roman 
Murdock was originally authorized to sign checks from Circle A 
Outfitters (2/15/95 Tr. at 118-119). Norris died in 1993, and 
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therefore, could not have signed the check (2/15/95 Tr. at 121, 
135) . 
Approximately one week later it was discovered that the 
check was written on an account that had been closed since 1989, 
and that the signatures endorsing the check, and the store 
manager's initials had been forged (2/15/95 Tr. at 120). The 
signature of Norris, and the initials of the store manager 
appeared to indicate that the person who presented the check had 
inside knowledge of Circle A Outfitters and Albertson's (2/15/95 
Tr. at 98-99, 173-174). However, at trial, the prosecution 
presented no evidence indicating that Young had such knowledge. 
Two witnesses saw the person that presented the check. The 
first was the grocery checker, Barry Johnson, who cashed the 
check. Johnson testified that he was suspicious about the 
validity of the check because it was computer generated on a dot-
matrix printer and that he was reluctant to cash the check until 
he saw that it appeared to have been initialed by a store 
manager, who incidentally was not working at the time (2/15/95 
Tr. at 86, 90-91, 98). Johnson asked for proof of identification 
and was shown the driver's license of Clint D. Young (2/15/95 Tr. 
at 91-92) . Johnson matched the license number on the check, 
which had been endorsed by "Clint Young," with that on Young's 
driver's license (2/15/95 Tr. at 93, 94). 
Johnson testified that he spent approximately five minutes 
checking out the groceries of the person in question, and was 
approximately three feet away from him during that time (2/15/95 
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Tr. at 95). Johnson also testified that the individual who 
presented the check was wearing levi's, a blue tank top, and 
cowboy boots, and that while the photo in the driver's license 
had a beard, the person who presented the check did not (2/15/95 
Tr. at 97, 101-102). 
The other identifying witness was Albertson's store manager, 
Greg Knighton, who was asked by Johnson to bring cash to his 
check stand (2/15/95 Tr. at 105, 107). Knighton saw the 
individual in question for a "couple" of minutes from a distance 
of about 10 feet (2/15/95 Tr. 109-110). Knighton's testimony 
differs from Johnson's in that Knighton recalls the individual as 
wearing a cowboy hat, as well as cowboy boots (2/15/95 Tr. at 
110, 114). He also remembers the person as having a large 
mustache or goatee (2/15/95 Tr. at 111, 114). 
At trial Young and his father testified that Young has never 
owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95 Tr. at 192-
193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's license 
almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194, 218-219). 
Detective Gerald Nielsen of the Orem Department of Public 
Safety was assigned to investigate the "check" on May 6, 1994, 
after Albertson's had filed a police report (2/15/95 Tr. at 125). 
He testified that he ran a check on the driver's license number 
on the check, which turned out to be that of Clint Young; and 
that he then obtained a copy of the license photo of Young 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 125-127). 
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Approximately two-three weeks after the check was cashed 
Nielsen took the photograph to Albertson's and asked Johnson if 
he recognized the individual (2/15/95 Tr. at 96-97, 128-129, 
137). According to Nielsen, Johnson identified the photo as the 
man who presented the forged check (2/15/95 Tr. at 129). 
However, Nielsen also admitted that it would have been better 
policy to have shown the witness several pictures and have 
Johnson point out the right one (2/15/95 Tr. at 138). 
Nielsen testified that he submitted the check and samples of 
Young's writing to Chuck Senn, a police expert on handwriting, to 
determine if the endorsing signature on the check was the same as 
the signature on Young's driver's license (2/15/95 Tr. at 129-
134) . 
At trial Senn testified that it was "highly probable"--but 
not positive--that the signature on the check and the signature 
on the driver's license were written by the same individual 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 140-161, 175-184, 189). 
During trial, the State, pursuant to the trial court's pre-
trial order regarding the admission of evidence of prior bad 
acts, asked the trial court for permission to call Holly Hales as 
a witness for purposes of "identity" under Rule 4 04 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence (2/15/95 Tr. at 162-164). Hales, who has known 
Young since high school, had allegedly received a check from 
Young written on the same Circle A Outfitters account as the 
check at issue in this case (Id.). The trial court, over Young's 
objection, allowed Hales to testify under Rule 404 to show that 
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Young had the "opportunity" to possess checks from the Circle A 
Outfitters Draper Bank account (2/15/95 Tr. at 174). 
Hales testified that on May 20, 1994, Young, whom she had 
known since childhood, presented a forged check to her at GGG 
Foods in West Valley from the same account as the check presented 
at Albertson's (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-207). The modus operandi 
differed in that in West Valley Young allegedly used a false 
driver's license as identification, and the check was not made 
out to Young nor did it contain the signature of anyone 
authorized to write checks on the account (2/15/95 Tr. at 163, 
201-208). 
At the close of trial, Young was convicted by the jury of 
one count of forgery in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-
505 (2/15/95 Tr. at 264-267). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
One, Young argues that it was prejudicial error for the 
trial court to admit Holly Hales' testimony of a prior criminal 
acts for purposes of demonstrating "opportunity" under Rule 
4 04(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence without considering whether 
the probative value of her testimony was outweighed by its 
prejudice to Young as required by Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
Two, Young argues that he was denied his constitutional 
right to counsel because of his trial counsel's erroneous and 
prejudicial failure to argue, at trial, that the prejudicial 
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nature of Hales' testimony outweighed any probative value it 
possessed under Rule 404(b). Young also asserts that his trial 
counsel's performance was unreasonably deficient because he 
failed to request of the trial court a limiting instruction as to 
the scope of the evidence of prior criminal behavior as mandated 
by Rule 105 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING 
TESTIMONY OF PRIOR BAD ACTS UNDER RULE 404(b) 
WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 403. 
Young asserts that the trial court committed error in 
allowing Holly Hales to testify, over Young's objection, as to a 
prior act of forgery at GGG Foods in West Valley committed by 
Young. At trial, Hales specifically testified that on May 20, 
1994, Young, whom she had known since childhood, presented a 
forged check to her at GGG Foods in West Valley from the same 
account as the check presented at Albertson's (2/15/95 Tr. at 
202-207) . 
However, the modus operandi in the act Hales testified to 
differed from the alleged Albertson's forgery. At GGG Foods, 
Young allegedly used a false driver's license as identification, 
and the check was not made out to Young nor did it contain the 
signature of anyone authorized to write checks on the account 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 163, 201-208). 
This Court has previously stated that reviewing the 
admissibility of prior bad acts is a three-step process: One, is 
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the evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b)? Two, does the 
evidence meet the requirements of Rule 4 03? Three, if the 
requirements of either one or two have not been met, did 
admission of the evidence amount to prejudicial error? State v. 
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). 
A. The trial court erred in admitting Hale's testimony 
under Rule 404(b) without first considering its 
admissibility under Rule 403. 
Young asserts that the trial court erred in not balancing 
the "probative value" of Hale's testimony to show "opportunity to 
have these checks" (2/15/95 Tr. at 174) with its "unfair 
prejudice" to Young as required by Rule 4 03 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence.1 See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 
1994). Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded 
if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger 
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the 
j ury...." 
In relation to the issue of prejudice, this Court has 
stated, 
Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to 
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if 
it appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of 
horror, provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise causes 
xYoung filed a pre-trial motion in limine with respect to 
the admissibility of prior bad acts wherein he argued that "even 
if the evidence meets the requirements of Rule 404(b), that 
evidence must be excluded if it violates Rule 403 (R. 37). The 
trial court deferred its ruling on Young's motion until trial and 
concluded that "Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered 
at the time of trial, outside the presence of the jury and before 
counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into areas covered by 
rules 403, 404, and 609" (R. 56). 
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a jury to base its decision on something other than the 
established propositions of the case. 
State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 
853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993). Utah appellate courts have also 
outlined several factors which must be considered when the 
probativeness of evidence is balanced against its prejudicial 
effect: 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the 
other crime, the similarities between the crimes, the 
interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the 
need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, 
and the degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the 
jury to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988). 
Young asserts that Hales' testimony, under the trial court's 
ruling that such evidence was admissible only to show 
"opportunity to have these checks", should have been limited, 
under Rule 403, to testimony that Hales saw Young in possession 
of a check from the same account as that used in the forgery 
committed at Albertson's. 
Young further asserts that it was error for the trial court 
to allow Hales to testify that Young, whom she had known since 
childhood, had committed forgery against her and GGG Foods using 
a check from the same account as had been used in the Albertson's 
forgery and that she had been fired as a result of her acceptance 
of the bad check from Young (2/15/95 Tr. at 202-208) . In 
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addition, Hales was allowed to testify that Young had even called 
her after the incident to apologize (2/15/95 Tr. at 208). 
The prejudice of this testimony clearly outweighs its 
probative value under Rule 403. It "influence[d] the outcome of 
the trial" by showing that Young must have been the one who 
committed the forgery at Albertson's because he committed the 
forgery at GGG Foods. It provoked the jury's "instinct to 
punish" because it established that Young probably commits 
forgeries on a regular basis. And it caused "the jury to base 
its decision on something other than the established propositions 
of the case." 
Therefore, Hales' testimony should have been limited to 
establish "opportunity"--or alternatively "identity" as requested 
by the State. The trial court's failure to balance the 
probativeness of the testimony under Rule 404(b) with the 
prejudice its admissibility caused to Young as required by Rule 
403 is clear error.2 In fact, the trial court even admitted that 
Moreover, it was obvious error. If this Court finds that 
Young's failure to renew his objection to admissibility of the 
testimony under Rule 403 at trial constitutes waiver, this Court 
should find that the trial court committed "plain error" in 
failing to consider the requirements of Rule 403 prior to 
admitting the testimony. See State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 
(Utah App. 1994), and conclude that the trial court's error was 
both obvious and harmful. 
Since 1988, Utah appellate courts have repeatedly held that 
before evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) it must be 
considered in light of the requirements of Rule 4 03 the trial 
court's failure to conduct such an inquiry must be considered 
"obvious" error. See State v. Albretsen, 782 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 
1989); State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291, 295-96 (Utah 1988); State 
v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994);and State v. 
O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 701 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 
(Utah 1993) . 
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he should "probably stopped" the State on at least a couple of 
questions asked of Hales (2/15/95 Tr. at 211) . 
B. The admission of Hale's testimony was prejudicial• 
Young recognizes that, even if the testimony should not have 
been admitted under Rule 403, he must still demonstrate that 
admission of the evidence amount to prejudicial error. State v. 
Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1010 (Utah App. 1994). In further 
clarification of the requirement of prejudice, this Court in 
Olsen stated, "In determining whether an error is harmful, that 
is, whether the likelihood of a different outcome is sufficiently 
high to undermine confidence in the verdict, we look at 'a host 
of factors, including ... the overall strength of the State's 
case.'" State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1011 (Utah App. 1994). 
Young asserts that Hales' testimony significantly bolstered 
the strength of the State's case. Although without her testimony 
both Johnson and Knighton testified that Young was the one who 
cashed the check at Albertson's and Senn testified that it was 
"highly probable" that the signature on the check matched the 
signature on Young's driver's license, there were significant 
difference's in the descriptions of Young offered by Knighton and 
Johnson3 and Senn also testified that he couldn't be "positive" 
The requirement of "harm" under the "plain error" standard 
will be discussed infra. 
3Johnson testified that the individual who presented the 
check was wearing levi's, a blue tank top, and cowboy boots, and 
that while the photo in the driver's license had a beard, the 
person who presented the check did not (2/15/95 Tr. at 97, 101-
102) . 
Knighton, on the other hand, testified that Young was 
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that the check and driver's license were signed by the same 
individual. 
In addition, both Young and his father testified that Young 
has never owned nor worn cowboy boots or a cowboy hat (2/15/95 
Tr. at 192-193, 217, 219) and that Young had lost his driver's 
license almost a year prior to trial (2/15/95 Tr. at 193-194, 
218-219) . Moreover, Young testified that he had never been to 
the Albertson's on Center Street in Orem nor had he ever written 
a check on the Circle A Outfitters account at Albertson's 
(2/15/95 Tr. at 214). 
Young maintains that Hales' testimony is prejudicial and 
must undermine this Court's confidence in the verdict because it 
greatly strengthened the State's by showing that Young must have 
been the one who committed the forgery at Albertson's because he 
committed a somewhat similar forgery at GGG Foods. It could have 
also led the jury to believe that Young probably commits 
forgeries on a regular basis; and it, likewise, caused "the jury 
to base its decision on something other than the established 
propositions of the case." 
Accordingly, Young asks that this Court find that the trial 
court committed reversible error with its failure to limit the 
admissibility of Hales' testimony as required by Rule 403. 
wearing a cowboy hat, as well as cowboy boots, and that he had a 
large mustache or goatee (2/15/95 Tr. at 110, 111, 114). 
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POINT II 
YOUNG WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
In determining whether Defendant was denied the effective 
assistance of counsel "this court cannot apply rigid mechanical 
rules, but instead must focus 'on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 670, 104 S.Ct 2052, 2056 (1984); State 
v. Snvder, 860 p.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). 
In order to establish ineffective counsel, "it is the 
Defendant's burden to show: (1) that his counsel rendered a 
deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, and (2) that 
the outcome of the trial would probably have been different but 
for counsel's error." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Hunt, 781 P.2d 
473, 477 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Crestani, 771 P.2d 1085, 1089 
(Utah App. 1989); State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985). 
As the Strickland two-prong test is being utilized, it should be 
remembered that the right to effective counsel is a crucial 
element of a criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights and the 
focus of the review should be "on the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is being challenged." Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; State v. Snvder, 860 P.2d 351, 
354 (Utah App. 1993). 
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A. Trial Counsel Rendered a Demonstrably Deficient 
Performance 
To satisfy the first part of the Strickland test, Defendant 
must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard or reasonableness, but the court is not to second-guess 
trial counsel's legitimate strategic choices. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 465; 
Crestani, 707 P.2d at 1089. 
If the requirements of Rule 403 in relation to the 
admissibility of evidence under Rule 404 must have been obvious 
to the trial court, it likewise should have been obvious to trial 
counsel. Although Young's initial trial counsel had brought such 
a requirement to the attention of the trial court in a pre-trial 
Motion in Limine (R. 33-38), Young's counsel at trial failed to 
even raise the issue when the trial court was considering 
admission of Hales' testimony for purposes of "opportunity" under 
Rule 404(b). Moreover, trial counsel never objected to the scope 
of Hale's testimony but allowed her to testify as to the 
commission of another forgery by Young rather than simply that 
she had seen Young in possession with a check from the same 
account as that used in the forgery at Albertson's. 
In addition, Young's trial counsel never requested that the 
trial court give the jury a limiting instruction under Rule 105 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Rule 105 states, "When evidence 
is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not 
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is 
17 
admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the evidence to 
its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly." 
In relation to this issue, the Utah Supreme Court, on more 
than one occasion has concluded that it is error for the trial 
court to refuse a defendant's request for such an instruction 
with respect to evidence of a prior criminal act. State v. 
Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith, 700 
P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985). In fact, the court in Johnson 
stated, "[A]dmission of evidence of other crimes creates such a 
great likelihood of prejudice... that the defendant is entitled 
upon request to an instruction that the evidence may be 
considered only for the limited purposes for which it is 
specifically offered." Johnson, 748 P.2d at 1075. Therefore, 
Young asserts that if it is unreasonable and erroneous for the 
trial court not to grant such a limiting instruction, it is 
likewise deficient performance for trial counsel not to request 
such an instruction. 
B. Absent Counsel's Deficient Performance a Reasonable 
Likelihood of a More Favorable Result for Young Existed 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by 
showing there is a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different. A reasonable probability has been described as 
"a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
outcome." See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 466; Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1089. "The 
benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
18 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of 
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as 
having produced a just result." Crestani, 771 P.2d at 1092. 
In this particular case the adversarial process cannot be 
relied on as having produced a just result. Trial counsel has an 
obligation to know the law and to understand its applicability to 
each case he undertakes. Young asserts that had trial counsel 
known the Utah Rules of Evidence, and had he understood the 
status of the law surrounding the application of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence with respect to prior criminal or bad acts, there was 
a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result. Young 
further asserts that, for the same reasons the trial court's 
error was harmful, his trial counsel's deficiencies were likewise 
prejudicial, and therefore, this Court's confidence in the 
verdict must be undermined. Accordingly, Young asks this Court 
to vacate his conviction because he was denied his constitutional 
right to effective counsel. 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing reasons, because of the trial 
court's error in admitting prejudicial testimony of a prior 
criminal act, and because of trial court's ineffectiveness, this 
Court should vacate Young's conviction and remand the case for a 
new trial. 
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z. DATED this ^T day of February, 1996 
Plji^yL^^ 
Attorney for Young 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant this day 
of February, 1996, to the following: Jan Graham, Utah Attorney 
General, 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, UT 84114. 
/ ^Cl^^y^UlA^~c^l--?y*'C&+~\* 
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MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLINT D. YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION IN LIMINE 
Case No. 941400580 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The Defendant, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, submits the following memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine addressing admissibility of 
evidence potentially presented by the prosecution. 
ARGUMENT 
RULES 403 AND 404 
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence states: 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for 
other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
Even if evidence of prior crimes or bad acts meets the requirements of 
Rule 404(b), Rule 403 provides that such evidence: 
may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of 
undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of 
cumulative evidence. 
Under Rule 404(b), evidence of prior crimes or bad acts is not 
admissible, unless, the evidence is presented to show motive, intent 
opportunity etc. Nevertheless, even if the evidence meets the 
requirements of Rule 404(b), that evidence must be excluded if it 
violates Rule 403. 
RULE 609 
Under Rule 609 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and its case law 
this court should disallow any evidence of prior or subsequent crimes 
in order to attack the credibility of the accused. Rule 609 provides 
"evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be 
admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting 
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused . . . " 
In interpreting the rule, the court in State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738 (Utah 1985)/ said "Evidence of prior crimes is presumed 
prejudicial. . . . " The Court of Appeals in Salt Lake City v. Holtman, 
806 P.2d 235 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) stated "Trial court's admission of a 
prior conviction because it was 'of sufficient probative value' was 
improper because this rule requires the trial court to balance the 
probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect." 
The Utah Supreme Court, quoting 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials 
at Common Law section 58.2, at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983) declared: 
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The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant 
committed other crimes was established, not because that 
evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to 
skew or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process. 
Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued, 'It is objectionable not 
because it has no appreciable probative value but because it 
has too much.'" State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988). 
The court continued: 
Thus evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible 
unless it tends to have a special relevance to a 
controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose other 
than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality. 
Citations omitted. 
Even if evidence of other crimes is probative of a particular 
element of a crime and is not offered merely to show criminal 
predisposition, such evidence is not automatically admissible 
under Rule 404 (b). Citations omitted. 
Defendant asserts that the reason for making the admissibility of 
another criminal conviction so difficult is in deference to the 
defendant's constitutional rights. The Utah Constitution provides as 
follows: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to 
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial . . . . Utah Constitution Article I, section 
12. 
Clearly in order for the other conviction to be admissible if 
Defendant elects to testify the court must, under rule 609, begin with 
the presumption that such information is more prejudicial than 
probative, and then the court must find that "the probative value of 
admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused." In reaching this determination the court may not admit the 
evidence "to show criminal disposition" under the Saunders decision. 
The decision goes on to outline the factors to be considered in the 
balancing the admissibility of the conviction. In the estimation of 
the defense, none of the factors argue in favor of admissibility. 
Factor numbered 5 argues clearly for the non admissibility of the 
other convictions. That factor reads; "The importance of the accused's 
testimony, as perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions 
probative of the accused's character for veracity." In this case the 
prejudicial effect of the defendant's not testifying may be 
insurmountable. The danger that the jury will be prejudiced by the 
defendant not taking the witness stand in this case, despite 
cautionary instructions are far to great. Additionally the other 
conviction does not even go to the accused's character for veracity. 
CONCLUSION 
Under the tests of Rules 403, 404 and 609 the evidence of other 
convictions should be ruled inadmissible in this case. 
DATED this day of November, 
Attorney for Defendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Defendant's Motion in Limine to C. Kay Bryson, Utah Cpunty Attorney, 
100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this &^ $ay of 
November, 1994. 
MICHAEL E. JEWELL (6254) 
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER ASSOCIATION 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, UT 84601 
Telephone: (801) 379-2570 
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IN THE FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLINT D. YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO LIMIT ADMISSIBILITY 
OF EVIDENCE 
Case No. 941400580 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
The Defendant, CLINT D. YOUNG, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure and based upon the accompanying Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities here moves the court to limit evidence 
potentially submitted by the prosecution. 
Defendant moves to limit any prior criminal history or bad acts 
of the defendant, Clint D. Young. 
Dated this day of November, 1994 
Michael E 
Attorney f 
. Jep£] 
or Dei 
11 
fendant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing motion, postage prepaid to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, 
Suite 2100, Provo, UT 84606, this ~7 day of November, 1994. 
Tab 2 
KAY BRYSON #0473 
Utah County Attorney 
JOHN L. ALLAN 
Deputy Utah County Attorney 
100 East Center, Suite 2100 
Provo, Utah 84606 
(801) 370-8026 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CUNT D. YOUNG, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
LIMIT ADMISSIBILITY OF 
EVIDENCE 
Judge Boyd L. Park 
Case No. 941400580 
The State, by and through Counsel, John L. Allan, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, submits the following memorandum of Points and Authorities 
in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of Evidence. 
FACTS 
1. On May 10, 1994, the Defendant, Clint D. Young, cashed a check from "Circle 
A Outfitters" for $396.69 at an Albertson's store in Orem City ("the Store"). The 
check was written to the Defendant's order and was endorsed by the Defendant. 
2. The check was signed with the names "John Norris" and "Stacy Fairchild." 
3. Prior to the Store's clerk cashing the check, the Defendant, upon request, 
produced his Utah drivers license. The clerk checked the number written on the 
•4 - ' ' T 
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check and verified that it matched the number on the driver's license. 
4. The clerk also verified that the person cashing the check matched the picture on 
the driver's license produced. 
5. Later, the check was rejected by the bank and was returned to the Store. 
6. The checking account from which the check was written, Circle A Outfitters 
("Circle A"), was opened with Draper Bank & Trust on April 4, 1988 and closed on 
August 8, 1989. 
7. Those authorized to sign the checks during this period were John S. Norris and 
Ronald Murdock. 
8. Mr. John S. Norris died on October 1, 1993. 
9. After investigation, a warrant for the Defendant's arrest was issued and the 
Defendant was arrested. The Defendant is now charged with forgery, a second 
degree felony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO EXCLUDE PRIOR CONVICTIONS PURSUANT TO 
RULE 609 OF THE UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE IS PREMATURE 
The defendant argues that the State should not be allowed to use prior convictions to 
impeach the defendant pursuant to Rule 609 and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
As the court is obviously aware, these issues are very fact sensitive and the State contends 
that such a decision could not fairly and accurately be made until the time of trial. 
Most of the defendant's current criminal history involves misdemeanor offenses. 
However, the defendant has other forgery charges pending against him. The State is 
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unaware of whether the defendant will testify. If he chooses to do so, depending on his 
testimony, those possible convictions could become relevant for impeachment reasons, as 
well as being highly probative. However, those decisions could only be properly addressed 
at that time. Therefore, the State requests that a decision in this matter not be made until the 
time of trial. 
H. EVIDENCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S OTHER CRIMES. WRONGS. OR ACTS IS 
PROPERLY ADMISSIBLE IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
A. Rule 404. 
The Defendant explains that under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, 
evidence of the other crimes, wrongs or acts ("prior bad acts") is not admissible to prove the 
Defendants propensity for criminality. Evidence of prior bad acts is admissible, however, 
for other purposes (e.g., proof of identity, knowledge, or intent). See U.R.E. 404. The 
Defendant further explains that even though a prior bad act may be admissible under Rule 
404(b), it may ultimately be excluded under Rule 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be 
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . 
. . ."). The State concurs in the Defendant's statement of the law. 
Beyond merely providing an exposition of the law, however, the Defendant has 
neither identified any particular prior bad acts nor articulated any reason for keeping these 
prior bad acts out of evidence. Consequently, the State can only guess as to what evidence 
the Defendant is asking the court to exclude and, more importantly, on what basis the 
Defendant feels this evidence should be excluded. 
Most likely, the Defendant is inferring from this exposition that the numerous prior 
Memorandum in Opposition 
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and subsequent incidences in which the Defendant forged checks from the Circle A account 
are inadmissible in the present case. The State, however, asserts that some, if not all, of 
these incidence are admissible to establish the following elements in the present case: (1) 
that the Defendant was the person who forged and passed the Circle A check, (2) that the 
Defendant had knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the Circle A check, and (3) that the 
Defendant forged and passed the Circle A check with intent. In other words, the State 
believes that this evidence should be allowed in order to establish the elements of identity, 
knowledge and intent. 
"Prior bad act evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being offered is to 
prove bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that character." State 
v. O'Neil. 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis in original). Thus, prior bad act 
evidence is properly admitted "'when relevant to prove some material fact including absence 
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity.'" State v. Featherstone. 781 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. Shaffer. 
725 P.2d 1301, 1307 (Utah 1986) (emphasis added). "When evidence may establish 
constitutive elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused, in the case on trial, it is 
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes." 
Featherstone. 781 P.2d at 426 (citing State v. Wareham. 772 P.2d 960 (Utah (1989) and 
cases cited therein; and State v. Johnson. 748 P.2d 1069, 1075 (Utah 1987) (evidence of 
other crimes was probative and necessary to prove identity of defendant); State v. Smith, 
700 P.2d 1106, 1110 (Utah 1985) (in prosecution for rape, forcible sodomy, and burglary, 
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the evidence of a prior criminal act to prove identity was admissible but subject to a limiting 
instruction)). 
In the present case, if the Defendant contests either the element of identity, 
knowledge or intent, the State maintains that it should be allowed to rebut the defense's 
assertions by presenting evidence of other relevant incidences in which the Defendant has 
forged checks from the Circle A account. Such evidence would be necessary to rebut the 
defense's claims and would be highly probative on these material issues. See Johnson. 
supra, at 1075 (evidence of other crimes is properly admitted "when it is reasonably 
necessary and highly probative of a material issue"). 
At this time, the State is aware of one incident in particular. This incident occurred 
at Triple G Foods in West Valley City, Utah. There, the Defendant presented a Circle A 
check to a checker who happened to be acquainted with the Defendant? Unknowingly, she 
accepted the check assuming it had the defendant's name and identification on it. She more 
closely looked at the check at a later time and realized the defendant had represented himself 
as Doug Renterio. The clerk immediately realized there was a problem with the check since 
the passer had signed a false name. 
This incident is highly probative on the elements of identity, knowledge and intent in 
the matter before the court. In the present case, the Defendant passed a Circle A check with 
the bogus signatures of "John Norris" and "Stacy Fairchild." The defendant endorsed the 
back of the check with his own name, Clint Young. At Triple G Foods, the Defendant also 
passed a Circle A check, however, the defendant represented himself as Doug Renterio. This 
Memorandum in Opposition 
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incident shows not only identity in the present case but also shows that the Defendant had 
knowledge of the fraudulent nature of the Circle A check and that he had intent to pass the 
fraudulent check. Sfig Johnson, supra, at 1074 (at a trial for forgery, the trial court allowed 
testimony from a clerk at a separate forgery on the ground "that the issue of the defendant's 
identity was in dispute, and [the clerk's] testimony, even though of another crime, was 
highly probative since other identity evidence was somewhat uncertain"). The State, 
therefore, maintains that this evidence should be allowed into evidence in the present case. 
B. Rule 403. 
The Defendant intimates that under Rule 403 all of the Defendant's other incidences 
of forgery should be excluded from evidence in the present case. The State, however, 
refutes this argument and maintains that these incidences, at least with regard to those 
mentioned above, are properly admissible in the present case. 
Under Rule 403, evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 
evidence." U.R.E 403 (emphasis added). Whether the probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a "fact-intensive question." State v. Morrell. 
803 P.2d 292, 295 (Utah App. 1990). "'[S]tanding alone, the fact that the evidence may be 
prejudicial to defendant does not necessarily render the evidence incompetent . . . If 
evidence is prejudicial but is at least equally probative of a critical fact, it is properly 
admissible/" CTNeil. supra, at 701 (quoting State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561, 571 (Utah App. 
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1991)). 
In State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988), the Utah Supreme Court listed 
several factors that a court may consider in balancing the probativeness and the prejudice. 
These factors include "the strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
the similarities between the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof and the degree to which the 
evidence probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility." Id. at 295-96. Under 
these factors, admitting the prior bad act evidence would be proper. There is strong 
evidence of the Defendant's guilt in the Triple G Foods incident; the clerk is a competent eye 
witness who is acquainted with the Defendant. Qt MorrelL supra, at 296 (strong evidence 
of defendant's guilt in view of competent eyewitness testimony). The period of time between 
the incidence is less than three weeks. Cf. O'NeiL supra, at 701 (three years) and MorrelL 
supra, at 296 (within months). Further, if the Defendant contests either the element of 
identity, knowledge or intent in the present case, the evidence would be necessary to rebut 
the defense's claims and would be highly probative on these material issues. CL Shickles. 
supra, at 296 (even where "other evidences of defendant's intent" are introduced, "the use of 
. . . other-crimes evidence" is "not necessarily" precluded); see also O'Neil. supra, at 701 
(quoting Shickles with approval and applying to case's facts). Lastly, this evidence would 
not rouse the jury to "overmastering hostility," and to avoid the probability of this, the court 
could emphasize to the jury the reason for the evidence's admission. See Smith, supra 
(evidence of other crimes necessary to prove identity and was admissible but subject to a 
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(evidence of other crimes necessary to prove identity and was admissible but subject to a 
limiting instruction); sgg al5Q, O'Neil. supra, at 701 and Morrell. supra, at 296 (even 
though prejudicial, the evidence was extremely probative of material issue). 
CONCLUSION 
Under the Utah Rules of Evidence, prior bad act evidence is admissible to prove 
identity, knowledge or intent, as well as other material facts. In the present case, the 
Defendant's prior and subsequent acts of forgery, which establish identity, knowledge or 
intent, are therefore properly admissible into evidence. Furthermore, under the factors put 
forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Shickles. this evidence should not be excluded under 
Rule 403. Therefore, the State respectfully moves that this court deny the Defendant's 
Motion to Limit Admissibility of Evidence in conformance with this memorandum. 
DATED this /$ day of November, 1994. 
CARLYLE K. BRYSON 
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY 
J0&NL. ALLAN 
/DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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Fourth Judicial Oistrlet Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
B. SMrm.ciark 4£ IN THE FOURTH .JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Dtputy 
STATE OF UTAH 
vs. 
CLINT D. YOUNG 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 941400580 
DATE: January 3, 1995 
JUDGE: BOYD L. PARK 
CLERK: NAH 
This matter is before the court on Defendant's Motion to Limit Admissibility of 
of Evidence. The Court has read the memorandum in support of and in opposition to said 
motion and being fully advised in the premises makes the following findings and conclusions. 
1. Defendant's motion is a shotgun approach to the supposed evidence to be 
produced at time of trial. 
2. Rules 403, 404 and 609 are fact sensitive, with certain discretion in the trial 
court. 
3. This court is without sufficient information to make a ruling at the present time. 
4. The court will refrain from a general ruling at this time and consider at the time 
of trial the objections of counsel for the defendant. 
5. Plaintiffs counsel should not inquire into other crimes, wrongs or bad acts of 
the defendant at the time of trial without first acquiring the court's permission to do so. 
6. The Court can more appropriately make its decision regarding what evidence 
should be allowed at the time of trial. 
7. Defendant's Motion in Limine will be considered at the time of trial, outside of 
the presence and hearing of the jury and before counsel for plaintiff seeks to inquire into 
areas covered by rules 403, 404, and 609. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 3rd day of h 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
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1 II MR. ALLAN: Judge — 
2 THE COURT: Okay. 
3 MR. ALLAN: The motion — or what I would be 
4 asking is that I be allowed to call Holly Hales. I 
5 planned her as a rebuttal witness. My only concern is I 
6 don't know as though the defense is going to call the 
7 defendant or not. I believe, however, from opening 
8 statements through, they have attacked the identity of the 
9 defendant being the one who passed the check. As I've 
10 indicated in a previous motion, Holly Hales received a 
11 check on the exact same account, which she received from 
12 the defendant, because she knows him from high school. 
13 She went to — with this gentleman to high school for 
14 years, knew him specifically. And the check was passed on 
15 May 20th ~ is that correct? I think it was May 20th, 19 
16 days after this check was passed. 
17 THE COURT: Well, we really ~ 
18 THE DEFENDANT: All I had to do was go to the 
19 restroom. 
20 THE COURT: We really need to have the 
21 defendant present if you're going to argue this. 
22 MR. CUNDICK: Would you briefly summarize what 
23 you just said? 
24 MR. ALLAN: Yes. What I was indicating was — 
25 THE COURT: Well, if we're going to have a 
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motion, I might as well sit down. 
MR. ALLAN: Okay. Based on the 
cross-examination and the defendant's opening statement, 
the attack is on identity of the suspect as being the one 
who went in Albertson's and cashed the check. What I'm 
indicating is that we have another witness here who 
received a check, exactly the same account, Circle A 
H Outfitters, the same account number, for $150. She 
received that at GGG Foods in West Valley, Utah, 19 days 
after this check was received at Albertson's in Orem. She 
will testify that she grew up and knows the defendant, 
that he went to school with her, and, in fact, lives very 
near by her, and that he came in and actually passed the 
check. She will also testify that the signature on the 
check is Doug Brentario. 
She at her position was asked to go ahead and 
accept the check. She saw the defendant, had even 
conversed with him, and simply went ahead and marked her 
initials on it, not looking at the name. But later she 
was questioned about the document because it was returned 
again as a forgery. And when she looked down, she 
realized that she had been duped into believing or — into 
not looking at the signature, because she actually knew 
the defendant. But she will testify she absolutely knows 
that Clint Young was the one who came in and passed it to 
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1 her. 
2 The reason I think it should be admitted into 
3 court under prior bad acts, Rules of Evidence, Rule 404, 
4 indicates other — and I'm reading from Paragraph B, it's 
5 on Page 558 — 558 is the page. "Other crimes, wrongs, or 
6 acts* Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 
7 admissible to prove the character of a person in order to 
8 show action and conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
9 admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
10 opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
11 identity, or absence of mistake or accident." And I 
12 believe the defendant has raised the issue of identity. 
13 I'm not trying to put the evidence in to prove 
14 that because he passed that check up there, he passed this 
15 one here. But I think it does indicate he had access to 
16 that account. He had checks just like the one that he 
17 passed to — in this case, he passed to Holly Hales in 
18 West Valley. And I believe it specifically goes to the 
19 issue of identity, whether these individuals who had taken 
20 the stand have correctly identified the defendant as being 
21 the person to pass the check. 
22 THE COURT: Mr. Cundick? 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, can I approach the 
24 bench? With all due respect, Your Honor? 
25 THE COURT: No. You have to do whatever you 
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1 (inaudible) tells you to do. 
2 THE DEFENDANT: I want the judge to see this. 
3 And something done. That is my rights. And I'll have the 
4 outside world here to see what —if you're trying to 
5 waiver the jury, I mean it's — 
6 MR. CUNDICK: The defendant wants some other 
7 people — 
8 THE DEFENDANT: — that I've asked to come 
9 here. And why they aren't here is unexplainable. They 
10 all said — and there's a lot of people that's supposed to 
11 I be here. And there is no one here. And my dad can't come 
12 in. And he's waiting outside there. And the courtroom 
13 should be open to the public. 
14 MR. ALLAN: Are you talking about witnesses, or 
15 talking about people? 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Just general public. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: The general public's welcome to, 
18 Clint, but not your father, because he's going to testify. 
19 THE DEFENDANT: I know that. He can sit out 
20 there. 
21 MR. CUNDICK: Okay. Yes, they're welcome to 
22 come in. 
23 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. Then I want a recess to 
24 call and have just a bunch of people that I know just sit 
25 back and see what's going on. 
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1 MR. ALLAN: I don't want to delay the 
2 proceedings so he can have his family come in the 
3 courtroom. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: I don't either. But I think 
5 that'8 fair. Don't you? Beings that you're up there 
6 trying to waiver the jury talking them into it, I think 
7 it's fair, (inaudible). 
8 THE COURT: Well, if they're here, they can 
9 come in. If they're not here — 
10 THE DEFENDANT: Sure. I'll go off the street 
11 and get some people to come sit in here. 
12 MR. CUNDICK: All of this is being recorded. 
13 There's a video that's being made of all of this. So it's 
14 not like this is a secret proceeding or anything. You 
15 know, you're certainly welcome to have everyone come in. 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Tapes can be changed. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: I'm sorry? 
18 THE DEFENDANT: Nothing. 
19 MR. CUNDICK: I don't know quite how to 
20 respond• 
21 THE DEFENDANT: I'm not going to say nothing no 
22 more. 
23 THE COURT: Well, if there's anybody out there 
24 that's here to support him or whatever, let them come in, 
25 as long as they're not witnesses. 
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1 II THE DEFENDANT: That's all I ask, Your Honor. 
2 THE COURT: There's no reason why they should 
3 stay out. Nobody's told them to stay out. 
4 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. Could 
5 we have just a brief recess, maybe 20 minutes, to find out 
6 where Holly went? Why her ex-husband stayed here and she 
7 left? She's not going to be a witness. She wants to see 
8 this. She was railroaded out. 
9 THE COURT: Apparently, if she's the one I was 
10 thinking of, she was having a coughing spell and left. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: Well, I know, but — she'll be 
12 all right, if I can get a hold of her, Your Honor. Trust 
13 me. 
14 THE COURT: Well, I'm not going to delay the 
15 proceedings — 
16 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. That's fine. 
17 THE COURT: — for that particular purpose. 
18 THE DEFENDANT: If anything — (inaudible). 
19 THE COURT: You're certainly welcome to come in 
20 and come back. We will take a recess when we get through 
21 with this, another 10-minute recess probably, for our 
22 sake, and then you can do whatever you want to do during 
23 that period of time. 
24 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. And if anything, I'll 
25 discredit my dad and have him come in here, and he won't 
1 testify, and just to see what — 
2 THE COURT: Well, whatever. It's your call. 
3 THE DEFENDANT: Okay. 
4 THE COURT: Mr. Cundick, do you want to respond 
5 to this? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: If you want, we can wait five 
7 minutes, and I could have her back up here, or whatever 
8 you want. It's — 
9 THE COURT: Well, (inaudible). I want to get 
10 over this part. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I don't want to just — 
12 THE COURT: I want to get over this 
13 (inaudible), then you'll have ten minutes to do whatever 
14 you want to do. 
15 THE DEFENDANT: I've been in jail for six 
16 months for something I didn't do. I always thought it was 
17 innocent until proven guilty. Not the other way around. 
18 Six months from my kids. My little girl had to go to 
19 counseling. 
20 THE COURT: Well — 
21 THE DEFENDANT: It hurt my little girl. My 
22 little boy. That's what I'm pissed off about. 
23 THE COURT: Mr. Cundick? 
24 THE DEFENDANT: I'm sorry. 
25 THE COURT: Do you want to respond to 
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1 II Mr. Allan'8 request? 
2 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, the general rule is 
3 that this type of evidence is not admissible. And the 
4 prosecutor has to find some sort of exception to — the 
5 burden is under him to find some exception. In this 
6 instance he's trying to come in under 404-B saying it's 
7 for identity. However, in this case, there is no 
8 relationship between this crime and what happened in West 
9 Valley City. I mean, it wasn't even the same modus 
10 operandi. In that case, you had somebody presenting — 
11 that she'll say was Clint Young that presented a different 
12 driver's license to get a check cashed. 
13 That's entirely different than what happened 
14 here. And in this case, we have somebody coming in that 
15 used Clint Young's driver's license, that signed it Clint 
16 Young. And they're having a handwriting expert to come 
II 
17 and testify that, yes, these are the same two. 
18 That's an entirely different fact situation 
19 from that in West Valley City. I don't see where it would 
20 really help on identity, except to say, yeah, there may or 
21 may not have been another crime that occurred in West 
22 Valley City, and it involved this particular person. 
23 They're not close enough. Their fact situation isn't 
24 close enough to warrant admissibility of that in this 
25 courtroom. 
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1 THE COURT: If I understand what Mr. Allan is 
2 saying, it's the same series of checks that were being 
3 presented, same account. I don't know whether they're 
4 numbered or not. But at least the same account number, 
5 the same checks are identical on the printed face of the 
6 checks. 
7 MR. ALLAN: I could show the court the 
8 comparison of the check in question here and the check — 
9 MR. CUNDICK: If I could — If we could just 
10 both examine them and see what we're looking at. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: (inaudible) ought to go around. 
12 MR. CUNDICK: If I could just show them to the 
13 defendant. 
14 THE COURT: Yes. 
15 (Off-record discussion at counsel table.) 
16 THE DEFENDANT: I'd just like a brief recess so 
17 I could call, go out (inaudible) before she leaves, and 
18 then I have to call her at home just so she can come in 
19 and sit and see what's going on. That's all I ask. My 
20 Uncle Jerry is outside. He's not a witness. I can walk 
21 right downstairs, get him, five seconds, and be back. My 
22 dad's twin brother. Got a twin brother that came with 
23 him. 
24 MR. ALLAN: Let's finish the motion. 
25 MR. CUNDICK: If we could have one moment with 
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1 I this motion, then you can go get him, okay? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: Could I walk out just until the 
3 jury is back? Since I don't need to be here. You're my 
4 lawyer. 
5 MR. CUNDICK: The defendant is requesting this. 
6 Can we let him go do that while we're arguing this motion? 
7 MR. ALLAN: I want him leaving on the record 
8 that he doesn't want to be attending while this motion is 
9 being heard, because obviously he has the right to be 
10 here. 
11 THE DEFENDANT: I don't have to be here when 
12 the jury isn't. 
13 MR. CUNDICK: Do you want to be here while 
14 we're arguing this motion? 
15 THE DEFENDANT: No, Your Honor. I would like 
16 to go out and — can I be excused for, say, 15 minutes 
17 while I just run downstairs, get my dad's twin brother? 
18 My dad'8 testifying, not his twin brother, either, or vice 
19 versa. And then I'll be right up when the jury is here. 
20 I'm not going nowhere. 
21 THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. 
22 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Your Honor. 
23 MR. ALLAN: You specifically understand that 
24 we're not — 
25 THE DEFENDANT: Very much, Your Honor. 
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1 MR, ALLAN: Mr. Young? 
2 THE DEFENDANT: What's that? 
3 MR. ALLAN: You specifically understand that 
4 you're an important part of the proceeding, and you're 
5 choosing not to be here? 
6 THE DEFENDANT: I am just stating that I have 
7 not had an important part in this whole matter, sir. 
8 || MR. ALLAN: I just want to make it clear for 
9 the record. 
10 MR. CUNDICK: I trust my lawyer to do in my 
11 best interest. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. 
13 THE DEFENDANT: That's why he's a defense 
14 lawyer. 
15 (Defendant no longer present in proceedings.) 
16 MR. CUNDICK: Okay. Your Honor, if you see, 
17 it's — 
18 THE COURT: The checks are — 
19 MR. CUNDICK: The checks are the same check, it 
20 looks like. 
21 THE COURT: The same series of checks. 
22 MR. CUNDICK: The same series of checks. But 
23 one — 
24 THE COURT: Everything was identical. 
25 MR. CUNDICK: Right. And one was done in an 
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1 entirely different manner. One was done trying to use 
2 these — these two signatures, and signatures that are — 
3 are they on the account? Well, one of them was on the 
4 account. 
5 MR. ALLAN: One of them was on the account. 
6 MR. CUNDICK: And this one, somebody just comes 
7 in and writes a check and signs it. I mean, there was no 
8 Clint Young driver's license provided on this one, or 
9 anything of that nature. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. ALLAN: Judge, just for clarification. She 
12 will testify that the driver's license she received had 
13 Clint Young's picture on it that was in question. But 
14 somehow he apparently made a false ID. But she didn't 
15 even look at the signature because she knew the gentleman 
16 before her, so she just okayed the check. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: Does that driver's license match 
18 Clint's? 
19 MR. ALLAN: No. It matches Doug Brentario 
20 so — but the real question — 
21 THE COURT: And where did she work? 
22 MR. ALLAN: At GGG Foods in West Valley. 
23 THE COURT: Okay. (inaudible) 
24 MR. ALLAN: Uh-huh. The real question in my 
25 opinion here is how does Clint Young come in contact with 
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1 I these checks? He really has no tie to Circle A 
2 Outfitters' account. And so there is an issue here of 
3 identity. 
4 THE COURT: Well, identity. But it's more than 
5 that perhaps is opportunity. 
6 MR. ALLAN: Uh-huh. 
7 THE COURT: That he certainly has had an 
8 opportunity to have these checks. And I think for that 
9 purpose I will allow her to testify. And then the jury 
10 can give it whatever weight it wants. And argue whatever 
11 you want, but the opportunity is there if he had those 
12 checks in his hands, at least that one check in his hand, 
13 and that can be definitely identified as being him. So 
14 there's an opportunity to get to these checks of which an 
15 account had already been closed. I think that's part of 
16 the exception. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: Yes, sir. 
18 MR. ALLAN: Thank you, Judge. 
19 MR. CUNDICK: Can we go off the record? 
20 MR. ALLAN: Can we go off the record? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. 
22 (Off record.) 
23 (In open court.) 
24 THE CLERK: This court is again in session. 
25 The Honorable Boyd L. Park presiding. Please be seated. 
Tab 5 
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1 THE COURT: You don't have any objections to 
2 that, do you? 
3 MR, CUNDICK: No, I don't have an objection. 
4 THE COURT: If you want to appeal anything, 
5 then we can possibly get it back. But we'll allow you to 
6 substitute it for the evidence. 
7 MR. CUNDICK: (inaudible) original, then we're 
8 going to substitute the original with a photocopy. 
9 THE COURT: Uh-huh. 
10 MR. CUNDICK: If I need it back for any purpose 
11 (inaudible). 
12 MR. ALLAN: Then GGG is turning it over to West 
13 Valley PD, so they should have it in their evidence so — 
14 THE COURT: Unless you get it tied up in two 
15 cases, and even then I think an order of the court can get 
16 it out for purpose of examination on the panel. 
17 MR. CUNDICK: Thanks. 
18 (In open court.) 
19 —oOo— 
20 HOLLY HALES 
21 having been sworn to tell the truth, the whole truth, 
22 and nothing but the truth, testified as follows: 
23 —oOo— 
24 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
25 BY MR. ALLAN: 
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1 Q. Can I call you Holly? 
2 II A . Yeah. 
3 Q. Holly, can you please state your full name for 
4 the court? 
5 A. It's Holly Hales. 
6 Q. And in what city do you reside right now? 
7 A. West Valley City. 
8 Q. And where are you currently working at at this 
9 point of time? 
10 A. At O.C. Tanner Company. 
11 Q. Have you been working there for a long period 
12 of time? 
13 A. I just recently returned there for about two 
14 weeks. I 
15 Q. And let me ask you, back on May 20th of 1994, 
16 do you recall where you were working there? 
17 A. At GGG. 
18 Q. GGG? 
19 A. Yes. That's a grocery store. 
20 Q. And where is it located at? 
21 A. On 41 South and 4000 West. 
22 Q. In what city? 
23 A. West Valley City. 
24 Q. Thank you. And what was your position at GGG 
25 Foods? 
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A. I was the manager there. 
Q. Being a manager, were you ever asked to accept 
or to okay the acceptance of checks? 
A. Yeah. That was one of my jobs. 
Q. Let me show you what has been marked as State's 
Exhibit 10 for identification. I'll ask you to examine 
that check. Have you ever seen that check before? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. And how do you know that you've seen it? 
A. Because my initials are on it. 
Q. Okay. When your initials are on it, what does 
that mean? 
A. I — my initials have to be on there. It's 
saying that I okayed the check. 
Q. And again, that is part of your job is to okay 
the check? 
A. Right. 
Q. Were you the one — did you work as a cashier 
at that store? 
A. No. 
Q. Were you the one who was actually cashing this 
check, or were you just asked to approve the cashing of 
it? 
A. Yeah. 
Q« Do you recall this incident, that check in 
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1 particular? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And why is it that you recall it? 
4 A. Because I knew Clint. I went to high school 
5 with him. Well, I've — basically he lived close by me. 
6 Q. Clint? 
7 A. Yeah. 
8 Q. Who — Clint who? 
9 A. Clint Young. 
10 Q. And you know Clint Young? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. He went to high school with you? 
13 A. Well, elementary and junior high school. And I 
14 didn't see much of him in high school. 
15 Q. But you also indicated that he lived by you? 
16 A. Uh-huh. 
17 Q. Okay. How close are we talking? Blocks or — 
18 A. Maybe two blocks. 
19 Q. Are you familiar with his family? 
20 A. No. Well, yeah. His brother and his sister. 
21 Q. Was Clint in the same grade as you? 
22 A. Yeah. 
23 Q. Would you know him on a first-name basis? 
24 A. Right. 
25 Q. And is Clint Young in the courtroom today? 
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A. Yeah. 
Q. Can you point him out to us? 
A. Yeah. That'8 Clint. 
Q. When you say "that's," you'll have to tell us. 
Describe — 
A. That's Clint Young. And I like him. He's 
always been nice to me so — 
Q. Okay. Which one are you referring to? 
A. The gentleman in the black. 
Q. Black shirt? 
A. Right. 
Q. Seated in the middle? 
MR. ALLAN: May the record indicate she's 
pointed out the defendant. 
THE COURT: The record may so reflect. 
Q. BY MR. ALLAN: Holly, did Clint Young give you 
that check? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. And now, if you look on the bottom of 
the check, how is the check signed? 
A. Doug — I was. 
Q. First (inaudible) 
A. It's Doug Brentaria or Brentario. I'm not sure 
on the spelling. 
Q. And you accepted that check from Clint Young 
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1 I with the signature of Doug Brentario? 
2 A. Yeah. The check was already signed when I 
3 approved it. And all I did — see, the cashier had 
4 already written the driver's license down with the 
5 expiration date. And I just basically checked the zip 
6 code for the area and the date that the checking account 
7 was open. And so with — the license was still out. And 
8 1 I did see the license. And I was talking with him. 
9 And — 
10 Q. When you say -him/- who are you referring to? 
11 A. With Clint Young. I was talking with him. And 
12 so I didn't even look to see that the name wasn't signed. 
13 So that was — 
14 Q. The name of Clint Young? 
15 A. Right. Wasn't on the check. 
16 Q. So Clint Young was presenting this check — 
17 A. Right. 
18 Q. — and you accepted it, but you really didn't 
19 even look at the signature on the check? 
20 A. Right. 
21 Q. Are you sure it was Clint that was passing the 
22 check? 
23 A. Yeah. 
24 Q. And was he buying groceries, or do you know? 
25 A. I can't remember that. 
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Q. What was the value — 
A. All I did was okay the check. 
Q. All you did was okay the check? 
A. Right. 
Q. What was the value on the check? 
A. $150. There was also another manager in the 
store that took one for, I believe — 
Q. Okay. Let's just talk about this one. What 
account is that check written on? 
A. What account? 
Q. Yes. 
A. You mean the branch of the bank? 
Q. Yes. Branch of the bank? 
A. Draper Bank. 
Q. Does it show who the check comes from up in the 
left-hand corner where you see — 
A. Circle A Outfitters. 
Q. Circle A Outfitters? 
A. Right. Outfitter. 
Q. Did you ever run into problems with this check 
later? 
22 I A. Yeah. It was returned to the store. And my 
23 boss threatened to — well, I did. I lost my job over it, 
24 so — 
25 Q. You lost your job over accepting this check? 
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1 I A. Well, yeah. And — 
2 Q. Did he question you why you didn't look at the 
3 name of the check? 
4 A. Yeah. And I said that's how come I remembered 
5 the check. I said, well, it was a friend of mine. 
6 Q. So what you're telling us is you accepted that 
7 check without looking at the name? 
8 A. Right. 
9 Q. Did you have any further contact with the 
10 defendant after you received this check? 
11 A. Yeah. 
12 Q. What happened? 
13 A. He called and apologized and said that he was 
14 sorry that that had happened. And he was very nice and 
15 said that he wanted to get the check back, maybe for 
16 payment, make payment on the check. And I said I couldn't 
17 get it because my boss had it. It was out of my hands. 
18 It was in the safe. 
19 Q. So he called you back and wanted to pay for the 
20 check (inaudible)? Is that what you're saying? Okay. 
21 MR. ALLAN: Your Honor, at this time I would 
22 like to — well, first of all, let me lay one more 
23 foundation. 
24 Q. BY MR. ALLAN: What is the date that appears 
25 on that check? 
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1 A. May 20th. 
2 Q. To the best of your recollection, would that be 
3 the approximate time it was passed? 
4 A. Right. 
5 Q. And did you make any other notes? You've 
6 indicated that your initials appear on the check. Did you 
7 make any other notes on the check? 
8 A. Just I circled the date that the checking 
9 account was opened, and the zip code. 
10 Q. Has the check to your knowledge been altered? 
11 A. The checking account was open and the zip code. 
12 Q. Has the check to your knowledge been altered in 
13 any way from the date you received it to now? 
14 A. I don't know that — the only thing that I 
15 didn't really notice on the check was the upper left-hand 
16 corner. It says 8 dash 89. I don't know what that is. I 
17 mean — 
18 Q. Okay. 
19 A. I don't remember seeing that on the check. 
20 Q. And there probably is another document — or 
21 another item stamped on the check, "account closed," or 
22 something of that nature after it went through the bank; 
23 is that correct? 
24 A. On the back side, maybe. It's not on this 
25 front side, no. 
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1 I Q. But the check did come back to the business; is 
2 that correct? 
3 A. Right. 
4 Q. And it was not honored by the bank? 
5 A. Unh-unh. 
6 MR. ALLAN: Your Honor, at this time I'd like 
7 to submit State's Exhibit 10 — or excuse me — yeah, 10, 
8 into evidence. 
9 THE COURT: Objections? 
10 MR. CUNDICK: Just objections as outlined in my 
11 previous oral argument. 
12 THE COURT: Okay. The court will receive 
13 Exhibit 10. 
14 (State's Exhibit 10 received into 
15 evidence.) 
16 MR. ALLAN: Your Honor, at this time while it's 
17 fresh on the jury's mind, I would like to allow the 
18 jury — or pass around State's Exhibit 10 and State's 
19 Exhibit 1 so that they can examine both documents. 
20 MR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, they'll be able to do 
21 it in the jury room. But, I don't — if he wants to do it 
22 now, that's fine. 
23 MR. ALLAN: I understand that. I simply want 
24 to do it while the testimony is fresh on their memory 
25 about has occurred. 
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1 II THE COURT: Well, I think they can do it at the 
2 jury room. If counsel will approach the bench for a 
3 moment. 
4 (At the bench.) 
5 THE COURT: I only want this check in for the 
6 purposes of opportunity. And I don't want it to 
7 (inaudible) to commit a crime committed somewhere else 
8 (inaudible). I'm going to have this go to the jury room 
9 and let them make a comparison there (inaudible). I don't 
10 want it to go any further. As a matter of fact, I would 
11 have probably stopped you quicker on a couple of 
12 questions, but — 
13 MR. ALLAN: My only argument in closing — 
14 THE COURT: But it's okay. Let's let them 
15 examine it in the jury room. 
16 MR. ALLAN: Okay. That's fine. 
17 (In open court.) 
18 MR. ALLAN: I have no further questions of the 
19 witness at this time. 
20 THE COURT: You may cross-examine. 
21 —oOo— 
22 CROSS EXAMINATION 
23 BY MR. CUNDICK: 
24 Q. Now, Holly, you just have knowledge of this 
25 particular check, correct? 
